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I INTRODUCTION 
The concern of public op1mon in the Federal Republic with national 
security affairs seems to have exhibited dramatic swings over the years. Up 
to the dual-track decision by NATO of December 1979 it bad become a 
standard lament that the attentive sectors of public opinion were largely 
restricted to the military itself, to selected political decision-makers, and to 
a few academics and journalists, while the public at large did not care 
about these things a great deal. 1 In the early 1980s, the rise of the peace 
movement and its activities caused the opposite lament that public opinion 
might pose a severe threat to the maintenance of a viable national security 
policy based upon the familiar combination of deterrence and defence.2 At 
the same time, these developments were hailed as indicative of a long 
overdue 'democratization' of defence policy. 3 However, the rapid return of 
peace movement actions and media attention to more 'normal' levels 
following the onset of new INF deployment cast some shadow of doubt 
over both interpretations. 
The events of the early 1980s bad some positive and some negative 
effects. Increased sensitivity vis-a-vis public opinion on defence among 
political and military decision-makers and among scholars can be counted 
on the positive side. lt becomes a democratic political system weil to 
realize that national security policy cannot be formulated and executed 
within a societal vacuum, and that it is faced with a task of finding some 
kind of consensus for its actions in this field, as is the case for all other 
policy arenas. On the negative side of the balance sheet, we have the 
familiar uses and abuses of data collected to describe public opinion. If 
people 'discover' public opinion surveys who are not familiar with this kind 
of material (as is the case for many members of national security communi-
ties, practitioners or academics) they tend to believe in crude figures and to 
take them at face value - on the assumption that they represent well-
founded judgements by the public on the matters of their prirnary pro-
fessional concern. When conflicting evidence becomes available - as is 
alrnost inevitable - arguments then begin over what the world really looks 
like. Such argurnents become particularly fascinating if they are based 
upon isolated and incomparable survey results, and when they are waged 
not in order to clarify what the public believes but in order to inftuence 
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public beliefs. These problems are well known from other policy arenas; 
the only thing that is new for the Federal Republic is that they now also 
play a role in national security debates. 
An important objective of this report on the Bundeswehr and public 
opinion, therefore, must be to avoid false (i.e. exaggerated) expectations. 
lt does not aspire to tell authoritatively what the public really thinks about 
the Bundeswehr. Instead, its claim is more limited and more far reaching at 
the same time. We will present an overview of available public opinion 
data and attempt to clarify what can and what cannot be concluded from 
this empirical basis with an acceptable degree of reliability. One has to 
realize, after all, that public opinion data are produced in a strange kind of 
situation. Respondents are asked for their views on matters about which 
many might know very little, about which many care very little, and which 
for them personally might be of rather low salience. Still, people give 
responses to such questions, for a variety of reasons. Thus, public opinion 
surveys invariably yield not only genuine attitudes (i.e. firmly based views 
and convictions that could even be defended against counter-arguments) 
but also so-called 'non-attitudes'. 4 There are grounds to suspect that the 
share of such 'non-attitudes' concerning national security issues is more 
than negligible. We should, consequently, not be surprised if public 
opinion on these matters frequently exhibits inconsistencies and contradic-
tions. These, however, should not provoke a debate about which polling 
agency and which question correctly assesses public opinion; rather, they 
can serve as indications for how deep seated these opinions are and as 
useful hints for interpreting the structure and dynamics of public opinion 
on national security. 
A final introductory note is in order: if it tried to keep strictly in line with 
the delimination of this project and the title of this book, this contribution 
should be restricted to attitudes towards the Bundeswehr as an institution. 
Even though this could be done, the result would probably not be very 
exciting. The Bundeswehr has now been around for over thirty years, 
millions of men have gone through it as conscripts, and the money spent on 
the military is one of the largest slices of the federal budget ( second in size 
only to the budget of the Ministry for Social and Labour Affairs). Thus, to 
a certain extent the Bundeswehr simply has to be accepted and taken for 
granted by the public, just like the police, customs, the public system of 
education, or local government and administration. Of course, there 
always is general grudging about the cost of the military, but the same is 
true for almost everything government spends money on. Moreover, most 
citizens get into direct contact with the Bundeswehr much less frequently 
than with other government agencies; it is fairly remote from most people's 
everyday life. Males of draft age are the only major exception, for the vast 
majority of the public traffic jams due to manoeuvres or low-fl.ying military 
aircraft are the main personal nuisances. Therefore, we can safely predict 
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the general tendency of public opinion towards the Bundeswehr as an 
institution. Standing military forces have existed almost always and every-
where, so the majority of people, who cannot readily conceive things tobe 
different, will accept them as inevitable (but not necessarily welcome) fact 
of life. This does not imply enthusiasm, however, especially if personal 
sacrifice or spending public money without immediately visible personal 
benefits is involved. This attitude pattern is not exceptional at all, but 
rather will be found for many govemment institutions in many different 
nations. 
If public opinion on the Bundeswehr by itself is not that exciting, what 
will then be the focus of this article? Two alternatives are available, at the 
microlevel and at the macrolevel, so to speak. At the microlevel one could 
focus on public opinion on the intemal structure and development of the 
Bundeswehr, on details of conscription, on deployment and organization 
of forces, on weaponry, procurement, etc. However, this would quickly 
lead to very specific problems over which the concept of public opinion 
would have to evaporate, because due to the absence of pertinent infor-
mation there simply could be no such thing. Rare exceptions would only 
occur in case of personal involvement (e.g. duration of service of con-
scripts) or of agenda setting by the media (e.g. dramatic cost-overruns for a 
weapon system, or the attention to Pershing IAs in the summer of 1987). 
Especially the latter case, however, is not exactly what we have in mind 
when we talk about public opinion on national security, because generally 
most people are not even marginally aware of the facts - which are 
disputed later - before the debate starts. Therefore, this contribution will 
mainly focus on attitudes in the Federal Republic towards national security 
at the macrolevel. The Bundeswehr is one of the key instruments of 
national security policy, and public opinion on this instrument should be 
assessed in the framework of beliefs on broader aspects of national se-
curity. Among these are fundamental goals of national security policy, the 
general security environment of the Federal Republic, alliance relation-
ships, trade-offs between military and non-military aspects of security, 
concepts of strategy and of arms control, etc. As the Bundeswehr is a mere 
instrument, logically attitudes on this tool should be derived from attitudes 
on these goals and on conditions of its operation. If this should not always 
prove to be so, this could be more important for interpreting public 
opinion on the Bundeswehr than a multitude of data on attitudes towards 
this institution itself and towards its internal design and activities. 
II ATTITUDES ON THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
This section will focus on evaluations of the military balance, of the 
military threat, of the <langer of war, and of the feasibility and acceptance 
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Table 5.1 Perceptions of the military balance (percentages excluding don't 
know = DK and no answer =NA) 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
Number of 
surveys 
6 
14 
5 
The West 
34 
15 
11 
Who is superior? 
Both equal The East 
42 24 
41 44 
41 48 
Source: Hans Rattinger and Petra Heinlein, Sicherheitspolitik in der oeffentlichen 
Meinung: Umfrageergebnisse fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bis 
zum 'heissen Herbst' 1983 (Berlin: Wissenschaftlicher Autoren-Verlag, 
1986), table 4; updated with unpublished material from Forschungsgruppe 
Wahlen Mannheim, Politbarometer, 1985, 1986. 
of military defence. Perceptions of the military balance between the East 
and the West in the Federal Republic have changed more from the 1960s to 
the 1970s than from the 1970s to the 1980s (Table 5.1). The smallest change 
is visible in the percentage of people ( about 40) who held both blocs 
(NATO and Warsaw Pact) to be equally strong, but from the 1960s to the 
1970s a substantial share of perceptions of Western superiority has been 
reversed with lasting effect: in the 1970s and 1980s the numerical relation 
between those perceiving Eastern and Western superiority, respectively, 
was between three and four to one, whereas in the 1960s about one-third 
had perceived Western, and one-fourth Eastern superiority. If one looks at 
these data on a year-to- year basis, it is obvious that there is no secular or 
irreversible trend of perceptions shifting in favour of Eastern military 
superiority. Over the 1980s, perceptions of Western superiority have 
remained roughly the same, but those of Eastern superiority have declined 
somewhat in favour of perceptions of parity of both sides. A parallel 
development of evaluations was obtained regarding the superpower mili-
tary balance: whereas in the late 1970s and early 1980s about three times as 
many respondents believed the USSR to be stronger than the USA as 
believed the reverse, by the mid-1980s this gap had almost disappeared.5 
Possibly this is in part a reaction to the policies of the new Soviet leader-
ship. 
In view of the fact that military power is a very complex phenomenon we 
have to ask, of course, what it is that people are evaluating when they 
respond to questions about the East-West military balance. Unfortu-
nately, no recent pertinent data that go into details are available. How-
ever, there are good reasons to believe that things have not changed 
dramatically since 1979 or 1980. For those two years Zoll reported that 
Eastern superiority was seen as strongest in numbers of military personnel 
and weapons; majorities viewed both sides to be equal in terms of morale 
and combat readiness of soldiers, defence willingness of populations, and 
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Table 5.2 Perceptions of a threat from the East (percentages excluding DK and 
NA) 
1950s 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
Number of 
surveys 
4 
5 
6 
17 
Is there a military threat from the East? 
Yes No 
71 
53 
52 
58 
29 
47 
48 
42 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit., table 6; updated with unpublished ma-
terial from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen Mannheim, Politbarometer, 1985 
and 1986, and from Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, 
Muni eh. 
training of troops; the primary advantage of NATO was perceived in the 
quality of weapons. 6 This analysis demonstrates that global evaluations of 
the military balance (as in Table 5.1) predominantly reflect perceptions of 
numerical conventional force ratios. 
Table 5.2 shows that the increase in perceptions of Eastern superiority 
has not been paralleled by rising perceptions of a military threat from the 
East. The major shift here occurred from the 1950s to the 1960s; for the 
past two and a half decades, consistently somewhat over one half of the 
samples have said that they perceive such a threat. This high stability is also 
found in a time-series on threat perception since 1962 by EMNID. On a 
scale from one (no serious threat) to four (very high threat), the mean 
score in twenty-two surveys from 1962 to 1986 was 2.47 (with a standard 
deviation of only .18), the mean for the 1960s was 2.55, for the 1970s 2.46, 
and for the 1980s 2.43.7 For all practical purposes, threat perception in the 
Federal Republic has remained roughly the same for the past twenty-five 
years. Those fluctuations that have occurred are either random, or mostly can 
be explained by spectacular events (e.g. Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Afghanis-
tan). 
With mean threat perception in the EMNID time-series at the middle of 
the scale, the data in Table 5.2 have to conceal that many out of the 
majority who see a military threat by the East have to regard this threat as 
not very serious. That this is actually so is demonstrated (for the 1980s) in 
Table 5.3. lf respondents are offered a qualification of perceived threat as 
high or low, instead of a categorical 'threat v. no threat' format, 'low 
threat' becomes a very popular response, not only for those who in the 
categorical format say that there is a threat from the East, but also for 
those who say there is no such threat. A further differentiation of threat 
perception is available in unpublished material from Sozialwissenschaftli-
ches Institut der Bundeswehr for 1984 and 1986. Respondents were pre-
sented with two statements on the nature of the threat, one describing it in 
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Table 5.3 Perceptions of the extent of the threat from the East (in brackets: 
percentages without DK and NA) 
High Low No 
threat threat threat DK, NA 
1979 10 (12) 41 (48) 35 (41) 14 
1980 14 (16) 42 (47) 33 (37) 11 
1984 34 (39) 40 (46) 13 (15) 14 
1986 23 (26) 43 (49) 21 (24) 14 
Source: Ralf Zoll, 'Sicherheitspolitik und Streitkraefte im Spiegel oeffentlicher 
Meinungen in den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika und der Bundesrepu-
blik Deutschland: eine vergleichende Analyse', in Ralf Zoll (ed.), Sicher-
heit und Militaer (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982); updated with 
unpublished material from Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundes-
wehr, Munich. 
Table 5.4 Perceptions of the danger of war in Europe (in brackets: percentages 
without DK and NA) 
1977 
1979 
1980 
1984 
1986 
High danger 
11 (13) 
9 (11) 
14 (16) 
26 (31) 
15 (19) 
Low danger 
74 (87) 
73 (89) 
72 (84) 
58 (69) 
65 (81) 
DK, NA 
15 
18 
14 
17 
20 
Source: Zoll, op. cit.; updated with unpublished material from Sozialwissenschaft-
liches Institut der Bundeswehr, Munich. 
traditional terms as due to Soviet aggressiveness and ideological expan-
sionism, the second describing it in terms of insecurity due to the accumu-
lation of nuclear overkill stockpiles on both sides. In both years about 60 
per cent agreed that the first statement was an adequate description of the 
world, while more than 70 percent agreed with the second statement. 
Thus, we can conclude that in spite of the increased awareness of Eastern 
superiority there has been little change in threat perception in the Federal 
Republic over the past twenty-five years, that a majority of those who say 
that there is a threat regard it as not a very serious one, and that threat 
perceptions are at least as much due to a general fear of nuclear holocaust 
as to fear of direct Soviet aggression. 
Against this background, it is not surprising that the fear of a war 
breaking out in Europe has been rather limited in the Federal Republic 
over the past ten years (Table 5.4).8 The same is true for the fear of total 
destruction in a nuclear war; whereas in the mid-1980s about 30 per cent of 
respondents believed this to be 'likely' or 'certain', the vast majority held 
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Table 5.5 Fear of total destruction by nuclear war (percentages excluding DK 
and NA) 
1984 
1986 
How likely is it that the world will perish in a nuclear war? 
Certainly not Probably not Probably Certainly 
23 
26 
43 
48 
22 
20 
11 
7 
Source: Unpublished material from Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundes-
wehr, Munich. 
Table 5.6 Expectations about use of nuclear weapons in case of war in Europe 
(percentages excluding DK and NA) 
1984 
1986 
Nuclear weapons would be used 
By neither side Only by the East Only by NATO By both sides 
41 
49 
5 
8 
2 
8 
52 
36 
Source: Unpublished material from Sozialwissenschaftliches Institut der Bundes-
wehr, Munich. 
the opposite view (Table 5.5). At the same time, public opinion in the 
Federal Republic was split over the issue of whether war in Europe -
provided it should occur, regardless of the probability of such an event -
would become nuclear or not (Table 5.G). With only two points of mea-
surement it is impossible to talk about trends, but Table 5.6 shows a 
striking reversal of the majority view between 1984 and 1986. While in the 
earlier survey over half the respondents predicted that both blocs would 
use nuclear weapons, this view was held by only slightly over one-third of 
the sample two years later. Over the same period, the percentages of those 
who predicted only one side or no side to go nuclear went up by about the 
same amount. This combination of results is hard to interpret, though. On 
the one band, one could argue that public opinion in the Federal Republic 
is gradually adjusting in its notions about war scenarios to the debate about 
the need to increase the conventional emphasis of Western defence. On 
the other hand, however, many people could have difficulties in comment-
ing on scenarios for an event that appears unlikely in the first place, so we 
would have to expect a lot of random variation. All we can say for certain is 
that, like threat perceptions, the fear of war (in general or nuclear) in the 
Federal Republic is rather limited and has in no way paralleled the growing 
awareness of Eastern military superiority. This does not have to reftect 
logical inconsistency - provided the Eastern military build-up is not seen as 
necessarily aggressive. 9 
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Table 5.7 Perceptions of the feasibility of military defence (percentages 
excluding DK and NA) 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
Numberof 
surveys 
5 
13 
5 
FRG could be defended against aggression 
No Yes 
56 
52 
50 
44 
48 
50 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit„ table 23. 
The incongruence between Tables 5.1 and 5.7 is not that easily ac-
counted for. While the sense of Eastern military superiority in the Federal 
Republic has grown since the 1960s, so has the notion that the Federal 
Republic could be defended against aggression by the East. In Table 5.7 
this increase is only mild, but a similar question by EMNID almost exhibits 
a secular trend of predictions that NATO would be strong enough to 
defend itself against Eastern aggression, rising from about 35 per cent in 
the early 1960s to over 50 per cent in the early 1980s. 10 This trend is closely 
paralleled by an EMNID time-series on whether the armaments and 
equipment of the Bundeswehrare sufficiently strong or not. Again, percep-
tions of 'sufficient' armaments of the Bundeswehr have increased signifi-
cantly (up to over 70 per cent in the 1980s), while the opposite view and 
response insecurity have gone down considerably .11 The question now 
becomes, of course, how to make sense of this obvious contradiction 
between growing perceptions of Western military inferiority and, at the 
same time, of the feasibility of military defence of the West. The answer 
probably has tobe at least twofold. First, the data in Table 5, 7 and similar 
compilations express more public confidence in Western defensive ca-
pacities than is actually there. If respondents are offered an intermediate 
category in between that successful defence would be possible or not (e.g. 
that this would be 'doubtful'), this is a very popular response, and esti-
mates that NATO could repel an Eastern aggression come down 
substantially. 12 Second, this contradiction has to be judged in conjunction 
with the low probability of war. lf this is seen as generally low, the linkage 
between the military balance and the feasibility of defence becomes less 
relevant than the linkage between the feasibility of defence and the 
country's military effort, and here we have the unpleasant logical con-
clusion that insufficient forces would have to be augmented by stepping up 
the effort. Thus, as an extreme interpretation one could state that the low 
perceived probability of conftict allows people to refuse adequately per-
ceiving unpleasant segments of reality in order not to have to draw the 
conclusions, which would mean sacrifice (to which we will return later). A 
third interpretation, which is not tobe pursued further, is that some (or 
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even many) people, when they respond to questions about the feasibility of 
Western defence, actually have in mind the capacity of NATO to deter 
successfully. Ifthey proceed from some vague MAD-notion of deterrence, 
NATO's capacity to 'defend' itself could then be viewed favourably and as 
largely decoupled from the military balance. 
Whether or not the Federal Republic could be defended against ag-
gression is not the same issue as whether defence should be attempted in 
such a case and how one would personally behave. The latter issue is 
extremely hypothetical, of course. Still, it deserves noting that, following a 
low in the mid-1970s, the willingness to participate personally in resistance 
against armed attack has again fiuctuated in the 1980s around 60 per cent, 
of which one-third were willing to fight and two-thirds 'somehow' to resist, 
while somewhat less than 40 per cent said they would personally reject 
resistance. 13 Not surprisingly, the share of people who believe that the 
Federal Republic should be defended militarily against attack is usually 
higher than the percentage of those who think she could be defended or of 
those who say they would participate in defence (upper third ofTable 5.8). 
This is not surprising because the notion of (military) self-defence in view 
of the concentration of troops in Central Europe and especially in the 
Federal Republic is almost obvious. However, the lower two-thirds of 
Table 5.8 show that this apparently wide acceptance of the principle of 
military self-defence is haunted by strong insecurity. As soon as people are 
reminded in the question that defence against an Eastern aggression would 
largely take place 'at home', support for this maxim drops considerably, 
and if they are reminded that it might imply the use of nuclear weapons on 
the territory of the Federal Republic, opposition against military defence is 
even stronger than the support found in general terms. These findings are 
very similar for all the five years in which these questions have been asked. 
Of course, you cannot, at the same time, have 80 per cent endorsement 
and rejection by public opinion of military defence of the Federal Re-
public. Elsewhere it has been argued that there are various interpretations 
for this pattern, and that a very simple one should be preferred. 14 After all, 
NATO strategy has been calling for the possibility of nuclear first-use for a 
long time, and that German territory, either Western or Eastern, would be 
involved in such first-use and/or Eastern responses is obvious to those who 
have at least rudimentary knowledge of these things. If the acceptance of 
Western defence none the less varies so widely, this has tobe due to the 
fact that the various question formats differ in the extent to which they 
force respondents to face unpleasant details of military strategy which they 
otherwise are unaware of or able to avoid. Table 5.8 thus reveals an 
astonishing lack of information and/or an astonishing reluctance to think 
about the prerequisites of Western security. If we assume that those who 
reject defence in the top third of Table 5.8 are completely contained 
among those who reject it in the bottom third, and that those who endorse 
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Table 5.8 Acceptance of military defence of the Federal Republic under 
different scenarios (in brackets: percentages without DK and NA) 
1977 
1979 
1980 
1984 
1986 
Federal Republic should be defended against Eastern aggression 
Yes No DK, NA 
In general 
58 (73) 
57 (74) 
64 (77) 
66 (80) 
53 (75) 
Mean 1977-86 60 (76) 
22 (27) 
20 (26) 
19 (23) 
17 (20) 
18 (25) 
19 (24) 
21 
23 
17 
17 
29 
21 
If fighting would mainly occur on West German territory 
1977 57 (59) 39 (41) 5 
1979 50 (63) 29 (37) 21 
1980 53 (63) 31 (37) 16 
1984 54 (66) 28 (34) 18 
1986 43 (62) 26 (38) 31 
Mean 1977-86 51 (63) 31 (37) 18 
lf nuclear weapons had tobe used on West German territory 
1977 
1979 
1980 
1984 
1986 
Mean 1977-86 
19 (24) 61 (76) 20 
15 (19) 66 (81) 20 
15 (17) 71 (83) 14 
16 (19) 67 (81) 17 
14 (18) 62 (82) 20 
16 (19) 65 (81) 18 
Source: Zoll, op. cit., table 15; updated with unpublished material from Sozialwis-
senschaftliches Institut der Bundeswehr, Munich. 
defence in the bottom third are a proper subset of those who endorse it in 
the upper third, in the average about 45 per cent of samples have changed 
their mind as the question varied. In addition, about 20 per cent do not 
reply at all, so we have to conclude that in total almost two-thirds of 
samples have either been unable ( or unwilling) to comment on their 
acceptance of military defence of the Federal Republic or do not hold 
consistent views, but rather sway with the ftavour of the question. 
III ATTITUDES ON THE BUNDESWEHR 
Let us now turn from questions that focus more on the national security 
environment of the Bundeswehr to items that directly deal with the 
Bundeswehr as an institution. In the past, samples have repeatedly been 
asked how important they evaluate the Bundeswehr tobe for the Federal 
Republic. In the 1970s and 1980s the share of respondents who have 
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described it as 'unimportant', 'superfluous', 'dangerous', etc. has seldom 
exceeded 10 per cent, while usually between 70 and 80 per cent have called 
it 'important' or 'very important'. 15 However, it is well known that ques-
tions of this kind that do not force rank-orders or trade-offs (e.g. in 
spending) exhibit a certain positivity bias in that every problem and 
institution is easily called at least 'important'. To make sense out of this 
kind of data one has to look at how responses are distributed between 'very 
important' and 'important' (which for many means 'not that important'). In 
the case of the Bundeswehr, responses are heavily concentrated in the 
'important' category, with 'very important' seldom exceeding 25 per cent 
of samples. Compared with genuine public opinion 'hits' (like efficient 
social services or securing jobs, that easily score 80 per cent and more 'very 
important') this implies that the Bundeswehr is clearly accepted as an 
institution, but that it is by no means regarded as of utmost importance for 
the Federal Republic (which is in line, of course, with perceptions of a low 
probability of war). 
Public opinion on the organization and on the effects of the existence of 
the Bundeswehr is predominantly positive. Since 1974 EMNID has annu-
ally asked respondents whether they believed training and leadership in the 
Bundeswehr to be good or sufficient on the one hand, or lacking in quality 
or even insufficient on the other band. From the 1970s to the 1980s the 
percentage of negative responses has remained the same at around only 15 
per cent, while the share of refusals has declined considerably, and the 
proportion of positive responses has grown from about two-thirds in the 
1970s to about 80 per cent in the 1980s. 16 In response to the question 
whether the existence of the Bundeswehr presented an obstacle to a policy 
of coming to terms with the East and thus a <langer for peace or whether it 
made peace more secure, almost 90 per cent of samples since the late 1970s 
chose the latter description as adequate. 17 That the Bundeswehr as an 
institution is regarded as moderately important and as weil equipped and 
trained, and that it is seen as contributing to the stability of peace does not 
imply, however, that national security policy is evaluated as a very high 
priority policy arena. This is obvious from open-ended questions on which 
prob lern areas ( up to three or five) are the most important ones for the 
Federal Republic (Table 5.9). The percentages of responses that refer to 
national security, NATO, or to the Bundeswehr have consistently been 
very close to zero since the 1960s. Even if one counts the preservation of 
peace as a pertinent response, such evaluations are still greatly outnum-
bered by responses citing economic issues and internal German politics 
(i.e. mainly social policy) as the most important political problems, par-
ticularly so in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Therefore, it does not come as a surprise that military spending is viewed 
by public opinion with considerable scepticism, even if no trade-offs with 
other policy arenas are required (Table 5.10). Of course, the statement 
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Table 5.9 lmportance of political problems for the Federal Republic 
(percentages of total nominations in response to open-ended questions) 
1960s 1970s 1980s 
Number of surveys 3 12 4 
Economic issues 37 51 50 
Interna! German politics 14 28 32 
'German question', reunification 26 12 3 
Preservation of peace 12 4 8 
Foreign policy in general 1 2 5 
European integration 2 1 0 
National security, NATO, Bundeswehr 1 0 0 
Others 7 3 2 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit., table 1. 
Table 5.10 Attitudes on defence spending (percentages excluding DK and NA) 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
Number of 
surveys 
3 
8 
3 
Def ence expenditures of the Federal Republic are 
Too high About right Too low 
40 
37 
35 
44 
51 
55 
16 
12 
10 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit., table 28, 29. 
that military spending levels are about 'adequate' is a very prominent one, 
and it is in fact usually chosen by . the largest ( and a growing) share of 
respondents. That defence expenditures are too low is a minority view that 
has declined over the years to about one-tenth of samples, while the 
opposite view, that they are too high, has also declined a little, but is 
generally held by more than one-third of samples. 18 This scepticism about 
military expenditures is also visible from several isolated survey items that 
are not available as quasi time-series. In 1979, only about 10 per cent 
declared their willingness to pay a special tax for improving the equipment 
of the Bundeswehr, andin the same year only foreign aid was accepted by 
more than half of respondents as an area where cuts of government 
spending could be made for that purpose. lf people are asked where 
savings of government expenditures should occur, foreign aid, the Bundes-
wehr, and the salaries of public employees invariably top the list. 19 
As conscription is the standard set by the Federal Constitution (Article 
12a) and as there have been almost no serious proposals to replace it by an 
all-volunteer force, little opinion polling has been done on this alternative. 
To assess attitudes on military service one therefore has to rely on data that 
Hans Rattinger 105 
compare this kind of service to its alternative, i.e. service in social agencies 
as a conscientious objector (Ersatzdienst). EMNID has annually since 1980 
collected evaluations of those who do voluntary military service ( as Zeitsol-
dat) and of draft resisters on a ten-point scale (1 for very positive, ten for 
very negative). These data show a mean average evaluation of those who 
serve voluntarily at 3.6., i.e. mildly positive, with very little variation over 
time. The mean average evaluation of draft resisters, on the other hand, 
stood at 5 .6 ( which is almost the midpoint of the scale), so that positive and 
negative feelings have balanced each other. The trend here, however, is 
that attitudes towards draft resisters have become slightly more positive 
(6.0 in 1980, 5.1in1986). Asked for perceived motivations of conscientious 
objectors, growing proportions of these samples referred to humanistic and 
religious considerations (54 per cent of total responses in 1986) as opposed 
to political or personal ones. 20 
Over the past years the consequences of current demographic trends for 
recruitment of manpower for the Bundeswehr have been debated exten-
sively in the Federal Republic. In 1986, the prospect that the Bundeswehr 
could eventually not meet its obligations to NATO due to a shortage of 
manpower was regarded as 'bad' or 'very bad' by 54 per cent of respon-
dents. When those who said that this was not so bad were asked (in an 
open-ended format) why they thought so, a whole range of explanations 
was offered, only one-fifth of which were clearly anti-military. The most 
frequent arguments were that the Bundeswehr would still be large enough 
(27 per cent), or that it could compensate lower birth rates by a variety of 
measures (20 per cent), from relying more on weapons technology to 
drafting warnen. 21 This latter idea of allowing women into the Bundeswehr 
(although not in combat roles) has in fact been debated in the Federal 
Republic for quite some time now.22 In August 1984, about 55 per cent 
were in favour of allowing women into the Bundeswehr on a voluntary 
basis, while the rest rejected even voluntary service. Not surprisingly, the 
majority in favour was somewhat stronger among men than among women 
(59 v. 52 per cent), but it may not be so trivial that opposition tended to 
grow steadily with age (34 per cent opposed below 25 years, 56 per cent for 
60 years and older). 23 
IV ATTITUDES ON NATO 
During the debates following the dual-track decision of NATO it was often 
asserted that the public opinion basis for continued membership of the 
Federal Republic in NATO was about to erode. The annual data collected 
by EMNID for the Federal Ministry of Defence show no trend of this sort 
whatsoever. If one omits refusals, the average proportion of responses in 
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Table 5.11 Attitudes on German membership in NATO (percentages excluding 
DK and NA) 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
Number of 
surveys 
3 
3 
8 
Federal Republic should 
Stay in NATO Become neutral 
53 
54 
73 
47 
46 
27 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit., table 17; updated with unpublished 
material from Basis Research Frankfurt, Trend-Monitor, 1984, 1985, 1986. 
favour of remaining in NATO or in an even 'strengthened' NATO was 91 
per cent from 1968 to 1986 (92 per cent for 1968 - 1979, 88 per cent for the 
1980s), while only 9 per cent favoured leaving NATO altogether or 
loosening cooperation among its members. 24 From these surveys one could 
conclude that support for German NATO membership has been extraordi-
narily high and stable, but they conceal an important qualification of this 
support as well as of its development over time. The EMNID question only 
leaves respondents with a choice between staying in NATO and getting 
out, so an overwhelming majority chooses continuing the policy of the 
past. Table 5.11 shows that things look a little different when NATO is set 
against an 'attractive' alternative, i.e. when neutrality is expressly men-
tioned. But faced with the choice between continued NATO membership 
and neutrality, this latter option - though in the aggregate being more 
popular than simply getting out of NATO - has clearly lost ground in 
public opinion in the 1980s, contrary to many claims to the opposite. 
Due to the Austrian, Swedish and Swiss examples, neutrality carries 
some positive connotations in the Federal Republic, but the willingness to 
accept this model is very limited, and it has decreased. Neutrality is viewed 
a little more positively if it refers to all of Western Europe, instead of to the 
Federal Republic alone: In the mid-1980s only about 12 per cent of samples 
completely agreed that the Federal Republic should abandon NATO and 
become neutral, while 20 per cent completely agreed that peace would be 
preserved if Western Europe would become neutral between the 
superpowers. 25 The reason that NATO is preferred over neutrality is at 
least twofold: first, even though such questions leave many people unde-
cided (one-third or more), those who see advantages for the Federal 
Republic associated with NATO membership greatly outnumber (by four 
to one or more) those who perceive disadvantages for the Federal 
Republic. 26 Second, NATO is regarded by many as the vehicle to tie the 
USA to the security of Europe and of the Federal Republic. For the late 
1970s it has been demonstrated that attitudes about the reliability of 
NATO and of the USA in case of conflict cannot be meaningfully 
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Table 5.12 Perceptions of US-German relations (percentages excluding DK 
and NA) 
1981 
1982 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Compared to a year ago (1981 and 1982: since President 
Reagan took office), US-German relations have 
lmproved Remained the same Deteriorated 
9 
5 
23 
25 
26 
49 
52 
62 
59 
63 
42 
43 
5 
15 
11 
107 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit., table 10; updated with unpublished 
material from Forschungsgruppe Wahlen Mannheim, Politbarometer, 1985 
and 1986. 
distinguished. 27 In the mid-1980s the notion that a European alliance 
without the USA would be better suited than NATO to provide security 
for the Federal Republic was accepted completely by only about 17 per 
cent of respondents. 28 Thus, for a considerable majority of West German 
public opinion the attractions of neutrality are transcended by the realiz-
ation that NATO is, besides everything else, an alliance involving the 
USA, and is therefore very useful for the Federal Republic itself. 
High endorsement of German NATO membership, however, does not 
imply great willingness to subordinate to American leadership. In 1985 and 
1986, close to 30 per cent expressed complete and about 40 per cent partial 
agreement with the statement that the Federal Republic should adopt a 
more independent position from the USA within NAT0. 29 In the same 
two years, about 85 per cent responded that the Federal Republic should 
behave according to its own interests instead of following the US position if 
the two countries should disagree over important political issues. 30 Such 
attitudes clearly are not anti-NATO, but they demonstrate that mass 
support for NATO has to coexist with the notion that the alliance should 
not be a hierarchical bloc but should somehow allow for the accommo-
dation of the interests of all participating nations. 
V ATTITUDES ON THE USA AND THE US MILITARY 
PRESENCE 
In the early 1980s, many observers were alarmed by the fact that relations 
between the Federal Republic and the USA were seen as deteriorating by 
sizable segments of West German public opinion. Table 5.12 shows two 
things, first, that this was a transient phenomenon that probably mainly 
reftected the debates about the implementation of the dual-track decision 
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Table 5.13 Attitudes on US troops in the Federal Republic (percentages 
excluding DK and NA) 
1950s 
1960s 
1970s 
1980s 
Number of 
surveys 
3 
2 
5 
3 
If the US would withdraw their troops, 
would you welcome or regret that? 
Welcome Regret 
57 
20 
25 
25 
43 
80 
75 
75 
Source: Rattinger and Heinlein, op. cit., table 12. 
and irritation about some more exotic, but highly publicized, interpret-
ations of American military strategy. By the mid-1980s, evaluations of 
these relations were quite positive, with about 60 per cent believing they 
had remained of the same quality, and many more believing they had 
improved than that they that deteriorated. This table also shows the extent 
to which such evaluations are sensitive to minor variations of question 
wording; when political leaders are mentioned in the time-frame for 
comparison, this appears to be a very strong clue. 
A cornerstone of US-German relations since the Federal Republic came 
into existence has been the presence of US troops. When concern over 
German neutralism and anti-Americanism swept many Western nations in 
the early 1980s, one could be afraid that this would also extend to these 
troops. Table 5.13 demonstrates that this has clearly not been the case. 
With between one-fourth and one-third of samples without opinion, those 
who would regret the withdrawal of US troops have established themselves 
as a strong majority since the 1960s, and there was virtually no change from 
the 1970s to the 1980s. The same finding emerges from the annual EMNID 
data collected for the Ministry of Defence: the average percentage against 
US withdrawal was 77 in the 1970s, and 78 for 1980-6. 31 When within this 
series of surveys it was asked for the first time in 1986 how people 
evaluated relations between US troops in the Federal Republic and Ger-
man citizens, 7 per cent called them 'very good', 50 per cent 'good', 37 per 
cent 'in between', and only 6 per cent 'bad'. 
This high reputation of US troops in Germany is due, first, to the 
predominant perception that their presence makes peace more secure. In 
response to an annual EMNID-question whether US troops in the Federal 
Republic increased the stability of peace or rather brought it into <langer, 
refusals dropped from 25 per cent in the 1970s to 4 per cent in the 1980s, of 
those who chose one of these two options, 87 per cent selected the first one 
(89 per cent in 1970-9, 84 per cent in 1980-{)).32 To an open-ended follow-
up question on why they thought so, a vast majority in 1986 referred to 
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American protection of the Federal Republic or to deterrence of the Soviet 
Union by the USA. A second reason for this high reputation is the degree 
of awareness in public opinion that these troops also serve the interests of 
the Federal Republic. In the annual EMNID surveys there is very little 
variation over time in the following distribution of opinions: from 1970 to 
1986 about 5 per cent have said that US troops in the Federal Republic 
serve neither side, 15 per cent named the USA as the main beneficiary, but 
24 per cent believed that West Germany would benefit most, and 56 per 
cent said both nations had equal advantages, so that about 80 per cent 
admit that the Federal Republic draws at least equal, if not primary, 
benefits from the presence of American troops. 33 This is also evident from 
results of the question of how important the presence of US troops was for 
the security of the Federal Republic. Since 1970 responses of 'indispens-
able' or 'very important' have ftuctuated around 80 per cent, while those of 
'not so important' or 'unimportant/detrimental' have been around 10 per 
cent, respectively. 34 
A third, and related, reason is that confidence in the possibility of 
defending the Federal Republic after an American withdrawal is not very 
high. While in Table 5. 7 we have seen that judgements on the feasibility of 
military defence (including all of NATO) were about evenly split in the 
1970s and 1980s, the percentage that believed that this could be achieved 
without US troops was only 29 (28 in the 1970s, 31 in the 1980s), while the 
rest believed that the Federal Republic would be overwhelmed under such 
conditions. 35 In that sense, US troops in Germany might also have contri-
buted to the decline of threat perception reported earlier. Presence of US 
forces thus is a vital ingredient of the credibility of the option of Western 
military defence not only vis-a-vis the potential adversaries, but likewise 
for !arge segments of the public in the Federal Republic. Many people not 
only believe that US forces in Germany make a decisive difference in terms 
of defensive capabilities, but they are also willing to express confidence in 
the reliability of American pledges to join in the defence of the Federal 
Republic, should this prove necessary: in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
usually less than 10 per cent said they did not trust American security 
guarantees at all, while at most one-third of samples recorded only low 
confidence, and clear majorities said that they believed the Federal Re-
public could rely on the USA very much or completely. 36 
VI ATTITUDES ON STRATEGIC CONCEPTS 
Due to the complexity and the technicalities of the subject matter, public 
opinion on military strategy is very hard to assess, as has already been seen 
above regarding the acceptance of military defence of the Federal Republic 
under different scenarios (Table 5.8). lt simply has to make a great 
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diff erence whether attitudes on deterrence and defence as general prin-
ciples or on their specific implications are polled, whether these concepts 
are tied to the presence and usability of nuclear weapons, and whether they 
are tobe evaluated as effective for the past or for the future. Available data 
show that from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s the notion that an attack 
from the East could best be prevented by deterrence has enjoyed compara-
tively wide support: about one-fourth of respondents were undecided, and 
of the rest between 60 and 70 per cent expressed a belief in deterrence. 37 
However, if the notion of deterrence is not explained to respondents at 
least in elementary terms, as is usually done, it has to remain unclear 
whether they evaluate deterrence as effective against aggression in terms of 
nuclear escalation and threats of punishment, of nuclear war-fighting 
capabilities, or in terms of a conventional posture sufficient to deny success 
to an aggressor. 
However, we have at least some hints as to what many people have in 
mind when they evaluate deterrence. If we remember the low endorsement 
of the use of nuclear weapons for the defence of the Federal Republic and 
the degree of scepticism about the feasibility of military defence, it seems 
very likely that many out of the majority who accept the view that Eastern 
aggression can be prevented by deterrence interpret this term not as 
implying conventional and/or nuclear war-fighting capabilities, but as fear 
of the possibility of nuclear holocaust. This conclusion is supported by 
recent EMNID data polled for the Federal Ministry of Defence. In 1984-6, 
respondents were annually presented with two views on nuclear weapons: 
first, that their use would be so terrible that they should be abolished 
immediately; and second, that they had not been used in the past three 
decades because the consequences would have been so terrible, so that 
mutual fear of their use had prevented military engagements between East 
and West - thus, without deterrence through nuclear weapons the <langer 
of a conventional war in Europe would be much higher. The second 
statement clearly describes an idea of 'pure' and 'extended' deterrence: the 
fear of mutual assured destruction due to the existence of nuclear arms is 
able to reduce significantly the <langer of any kind of military conflict. 
About 60 per cent of samples in all three years have agreed with this 
second statement (and thus implicitly voted against the immediate abol-
ition of these weapons). However, this attitude vis-ii-vis deterrence by 
nuclear weapons only accepts them as 'political' weapons in the role of 
preventing any military conflict through mutual fear. Scenarios for their 
concrete military use meet very high resistance in public opinion, and the 
events of the early 1980s have shown that anything related to specific 
nuclear weapon systems, particularly in Europe, or to enhancing the 
credibility of their use will provoke considerable public antagonism. 38 
Nuclear deterrence only receives majority support in the Federal Republic 
if these weapons can be seen as remote, purely 'political' in their effects, as 
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never having to be used because of their mere existence, and as almost 
perfectly getting rid of the <langer of any war in Europe, thus throwing 
unpleasant war-fighting scenarios into obsolescence. 
That quite favourable attitudes towards the idea of nuclear deterrence 
do not have to go along with equally favourable opinions about nuclear 
weapons, particularly about new weapons or about West German involve-
ment in such armament programmes, is clearly visible in recent public 
opinion on a possible participation of the Federal Republic in SDI. In three 
surveys in 1985, about 20 per cent had never heard about SDI or had no 
opinion on German participation, among the others 40 per cent were in 
favour of, and 60 per cent were opposed to, participation of the Federal 
Republic. 39 This is in line with the fact that new weapons and increases of 
arms levels are usually much less popular than arms control and disarma-
ment, or than at least leaving things as they are. This has been shown with 
abundant clarity with respect to the two aspects ( deployment of new INF v. 
arms control) of the NATO dual-track decision, and it is also evident from 
a more general question (in 1984), whether to avoid a war the Federal 
Republic should increase its military power, disarm, or maintain the 
present status. Not surprisingly, 55 per cent chose the latter option, while 5 
per cent picked the first one, but a sizable 39 per cent called for disarma-
ment, even though this response was not presented in the framework of 
mutual arms restraint. 4° From the reflections of the INF-debate in West 
German public opinion, it is clear that if arms control and disarmament are 
described as designed to bind both sides, these concepts are at least as 
popular as nuclear deterrence by the fear of mutual assured extinction, and 
much more popular than programmes to enhance Western military capa-
bilities and options. 
lt is precisely over this balance between maintaining deterrence and 
defence on the one hand, and pursuing detente, arms control, and disarma-
ment on the other, that public opinion in the Federal Republic vis-a-vis the 
USA as the leading ally has shifted in recent years. Substantial majorities 
of the public in West Germany want both, and there is little doubt that the 
US firmly stands for the first strategy. But there is considerable insecurity 
as to whether the USA takes the second strategy as equally serious, or even 
as seriously as the Soviet Union. This can be concluded from several data 
collected over the past couple of years. When asked whether the USA 
sought a military balance or military superiority vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, 
or was ready to accept inferiority, in the average of 1982-6 only 3 per cent 
held the latter view, 50 per cent said the USA was aiming at a military 
balance, but 45 per cent believed that superiority was their goal. At the 
same time, perceptions that the Soviet Union would abuse Western will-
ingness to pursue detente dropped from 55 per cent in 1982 to 37 per cent in 
1986, while the view that the Soviet Union itself was seriously pursuing 
detente increased from 41 to 61 per cent. 41 A similar trend was obtained 
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with the question whether in the Geneva negotiations both superpowers 
were serious about going for arms control. About 20 per cent in 1985 and 
1986 said that both were serious, and 10 per cent said this about the USA 
alone. The perception that neither side really wanted an arms control 
agreement dropped from 1985 to 1986 from above 60 to about 50 per cent, 
but the share of samples that attributed a serious arms control intention to 
the Soviet Union alone grew from 5 to 16 per cent, so that in late 1986 the 
Soviet Union was seen by more as seriously engaged in arms control than 
was the USA. 42 Such findings, by the way, closely parallel those about 
evaluations of the leaders of the two superpowers, where Mr Gorbachev 
clearly pushed ahead in the 'popularity contest' with Mr Reagan. 43 
Thus, public opinion in the Federal Republic seems to be increasingly 
worried that the reliability, credibility and effectiveness of Western deter-
rence and defence is not matched by equally credible efforts to pursue 
detente and arms control, which are also regarded as indispensable for 
security. 
VII ATIITUDES ON NATIONAL SECURITY BY PARTISAN 
PREFERENCE AND AGE 
So far these attitudes have been described in the aggregate without any 
breakdowns for subgroups. In the past it has often been argued that recent 
major changes in public opinion on national security in the Federal 
Republic have to a significant degree been due to generational replace-
ment. 44 Many of the longitudinal data described so far do not go along very 
weil with this explanation, because they have exhibited remarkable stab-
ility in spite of the fact that a time-span of fifteen or twenty years involves a 
considerable degree of demographic turnover. Still, as a final step we will 
now have a look at the distributions of attitudes by age (which is the most 
potent social structural variable in the Federal Republic for differentiating 
national security views, more potent even than education) in the 1986 
EMNID-survey of opinions on defence,45 and we will compare them to 
distributions by partisan affiliation, since a rival explanation would hold 
that such affiliations should be at least as strong in shaping such attitudes as 
common political socialization of cohorts. To simplify the presentation, 
Table 5.14 does not !ist complete response distributions, but only percent-
ages of pro-defence, pro-NATO, pro-Bundeswehr, etc. responses and 
their polarization by age and by party. Maximum polarization by age is 
presented by setting the extreme age group above 29 years against the age 
group with extreme views (in the opposite direction) below 30 years. 
Distances of opinion by partisan preference are reported between those 
who intended to vote for the CDU/CSU, the SPD, and for the Green 
Party, respectively. Adherents of the liberal FDP are omitted from this 
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table; usually their views are somewhere in between those of followers of 
the major two parties. 
Table 5 .14 shows that the total 'successor generation' of younger voters 
in 1986 clearly differed from older West Germans in their opinions on 
national security. On all twenty-one items the extreme value for younger 
people shows them to be more anti-military, anti-US, and anti-NATO. 
However, with an overall mean of 14.5 percentage points most of these 
differences are far from being dramatic, especially if one considers the way 
they were computed, i.e. searching for the maximum polarization between 
any younger and any older cohort, instead of, say, computing averages 
above and below the age of 30. Moreover, only for five items is the 
majority reversed: on whether deterrence prevents a war, on the severity 
of the manpower problems the Bundeswehr might face, on the size of the 
defence budget, on relations between German citizens and US troops, and 
on whether the US is aiming for a military balance instead of superiority. 
On all other items, majorities of the extreme pro-defence age group above 
29 and of the extreme anti-defence group below 30 are in agreement! The 
only thing that sets them apart, of course, is the size of these majorities. 
Thus, it is undoubtedly true that most anti-military and anti-US activists of 
recent years have been younger people, but the conclusion, that the young 
overwhelmingiy tend to be anti-military and anti-US, simply is not sup-
ported by these data. Even in the most sceptical age group (usually 25-29 
years), majorities support continued German membership in NATO and 
presence of US troops, say they would resist aggression somehow, and 
endorse the views that the existence of the Bundeswehr and the presence 
of US troops make peace more secure, that these troops are very important 
for West German security, and that without them defence would no longer 
be possible. 
Let us now look at the attitudinal distances between partisan groups, 
first between CDU/CSU and Green voters. On every single item public 
opinion here was polarized much more strongly along partisan lines than 
along age. With an average difference of 41.2 percentage points between 
sympathizers of the Christian Democrats and of the Green Party, the latter 
conform much more closely to the notions often advanced about the 
'successor generation' as a whole. Polarization along both criteria is least 
dissimilar for perceptions of the defensive capabilities of NATO and of the 
Bundeswehr, and, at the other extreme, it is much stronger by party than 
by age for attitudes on defence spending, on membership in NATO, on the 
presence of US troops, and on the contribution of the Bundeswehr to make 
peace more secure. For fourteen out of the twenty-one items the majority 
is reversed between adherents of both these parties, and the mean polariz-
ation for these items is over 47 percentage points, so that comparatively 
small minorities within one group correspond to outspoken majorities 
within the other group, and vice versa. 
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Table 5.14 Polarization of 1986 attitudes on national security, the Bundeswehr, 
and on the alliance by partisan sympathy and age (percentages holding 
'pro-defence', etc. views) 
Item Total Followers of Diff erences Extreme Differ-
between parties age group ence 
CDU/ CDU/ SPD- over under by age 
CDU/ Green CSU- CSU- Green 29 30 
CSU SPD Party Green SPD years years 
1 20 24 19 8 16 5 11 22 D 20 B 2 
2 29 36 24 9 27 12 15 31 c 24 B 7 
3 37 53 25 7 46 28 18 40D 33 B 7 
4 40 43 39 33 10 4 6 45 D 37 A 8 
5 35 49 28 9 40 21 19 40D 28 B 12 
6 58 70 55 25 45 15 30 64 E 47 B 17 
Mean difference items 1-6 30.7 14.2 16.5 8.8 
7 16 19 15 8 11 4 7 18 D 11 B 7 
8 60 69 55 28 41 14 27 70 c 60 B 10 
9 87 95 85 40 55 10 45 91 D 78 B 13 
10 56 69 50 14 55 19 36 63 D 48 B 15 
11 84 89 82 61 28 7 21 87 c 71 B 16 
12 55 65 53 10 55 12 43 65 D 46 B 19 
13 66 81 60 25 56 21 35 78 D 50 A 28 
Mean difference items 7-13 43.0 12.4 30.6 15.4 
14 25 30 22 6 24 8 16 26 D 19 B 7 
15 74 87 69 26 61 18 43 81 D 65 B 16 
16 62 70 57 36 34 13 21 69 D 51 B 18 
17 57 65 50 25 40 15 25 67 D 48 A 19 
18 48 60 42 15 45 18 27 60 D 40 A 20 
19 81 93 77 39 54 16 38 88 D 68 B 20 
20 77 88 72 27 61 16 45 85 E 65 B 20 
21 75 86 70 25 61 16 45 83 E 59 B 24 
Mean difference items 14-21 47.5 15.0 32.5 18.0 
Mean difference all items 41.2 13.9 27.3 14.5 
Source: EMNID, 'Meinungsbild zur wehrpolitischen Lage - Herbst 1986, 
Bielefeld, 1986. 
Items 
Attitudes on the national security environment 
1 USSR is stronger than US in military terms. 
2 Tue East is stronger than the West in military terms. 
3 Moscow abuses Western willingness to cooperate. 
4 NATO is not strong enough for defence. 
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5 The threat from the East is high/very high. 
6 Deterrence prevents a war in Europe. 
Attitudes on the Bundeswehr 
7 Equipment of the Bundeswehr is insufficient. 
8 Respondent would somehow resist military aggression. 
9 The existence of the Bundeswehr makes peace more secure. 
10 Defence expenditures are about right or too Iow. 
11 Training and Ieadership of the Bundeswehr are good/sufficient. 
12 Recruitment problems of the Bundeswehr are serious/very serious. 
13 Positive evaluations of enlisted soldiers (1 to 4 on ten-point scale). 
Attitudes on the alliance 
14 US military presence mainly benefits the Federal Republic. 
15 Respondent opposed to withdrawal of US forces. 
16 NATO would not be strong enough without US military presence. 
17 Relations between Germans and US troops are good/very good. 
18 US want military balance (instead of superiority). 
19 US military presence makes peace more secure. 
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20 US military presence is important/indispensable for security of the Federal 
Republic. 
21 The Federal Republic should continue its membership in NATO. 
In the two columns for age groups capital letters A to E denote in which group 
extreme attitudes occur: 
A 16-24 years 
B 25-29 years 
C 30-49 years 
D 50-64 years 
E 65 years and older 
Without exception, the opinions of SPD voters fall between those of 
adherents of the CDU/CSU and of the Green party, but generally they are 
much closer to those of Christian Democratic identifiers. On average, the 
attitudinal distance between SPD and CDU/CSU sympathizers is only half 
as wide as between SPD and Green voters (13.9 v. 27.3 percentage points 
of difference). In relative terms, SPD followers are farthest away from 
CDU/CSU voters (and thus closest to the Greens) in their views on the 
national security environment, and closest to them in their opinions on the 
Bundeswehr and on the Western alliance. For only two items (3 and 18) 
are majorities among adherents of the major two parties not in agreement, 
whereas comparing SPD to Green voters one finds majorities disagreeing 
on 12 out of the 21 items. SPD identifiers are closer to Green sympathizers 
than to CDU/CSU voters for only two items (3 and 5), so that we see 
attitudes of the adherents of the major two parties deviating most sharply 
over the extent of an Eastern threat and over Soviet trustworthiness. An 
average partisan disparity of national security attitudes of 13.9 percentage 
points is more than trivial, of course, but interpreting its political signifi-
cance is a little like having to adjudicate whether the famous glass of water 
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is half full or half empty. At least to this author this degree of disagreement 
is not dramatic, especially when compared to how far supporters of the 
Greens on average are away from voters of both major parties. Even 
though this is not at all true at the level of party leaderships and activists, at 
the level of mass attitudes among their constituencies there still seems tobe 
a fairly consensual basis for a 'great coalition' over security issues. 
Polarizations by partisan affiliations and by age have been treated 
separately here, even though in reality they are related, of course. lt would 
be very useful now to investigate the association between partisan choice 
and security opinions controlling for age, and maybe additionally for 
education. However, since the results of the 1986-EMNID study were only 
available as bivariate breakdowns while the original data set was not 
accessible, this is impossible. We cannot, therefore, empirically demon-
strate within this data-set the well-known fact that attitudes opposed to the 
Bundeswehr, to NATO, etc. are even much more highly concentrated than 
is visible in Table 5 .14 if one focuses on young subgroups with high 
education among the Green and also the SPD electorate. This does not 
hurt the argument too much, however, as such findings about the selective 
recruitment of protesters and activists are special neither to the 1980s nor 
to the Federal Republic, just as this article deliberately deals with mass and 
not with elite opinions. 
But even without the original data set we can take an important step 
towards solving the problem as to whether the effect of partisan identifi-
cations we have found here on the polarization of these mass opinions is 
not to a large extent an artifact of their polarization by age. We can 
perform a little intellectual experiment by assuming that in comparing two 
groups of partisans all adherents of the more 'conservative' party belong to 
the most 'pro-defence' age group over 29 years, while all voters of the 
second party can be found in the most 'anti-defence' age group under 30 
years. Under such circumstances we could simply subtract the maximum 
difference of security attitudes by age ( reported in Table 5 .14) from this 
distance by party in order to arrive at the 'net' effect of partisan affiliations. 
In the average of all twenty-one items in Table 5.14, this simple procedure 
for the pair of CDU/CSU and SPD yields a 'net' difference of - .6 
percentage points, for SPD and Greens of 12.8, and for CDU/CSU and 
Greens of 26.7 percentage points. This would suggest that 'controlling' for 
age there is virtually no distinction between CDU/CSU and SPD voters, 
while the 'net' distances between Green sympathizers, on the one hand, 
and CDU/CSU and SPD supporters, on the other hand, that genuinely are 
due to partisan affiliation, are only about two-thirds and half as strong, 
respectively, as appears in Table 5.14. We know, however, that our 
assumption of a neat separation of the voters for two different parties by 
age is patently wrong. In the 1987 federal elections the CDU/CSU received 
16. 7 per cent of its votes from voters below age 30, the corresponding 
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figures for the SPD and the Greens are 20. 9 and 44. 9, respectively. 46 Thus, 
the distance in defence opinions between identifiers of the two major 
parties can not all be due to differences in their age composition. As to the 
Green voters, their mean attitudinal distances from CDU/CSU followers 
of 41.2 and from SPD adherents of 27.3 percentage points to some extent 
certainly do reflect age differences, and thus are somewhat inflated. But 
since even here we are far away from a perfect partisan bisection along the 
30-year watershed, it is safe to conclude that the true 'net' effect of partisan 
identifications is still well over 30 percentage points for the attitudinal 
differences between CDU/CSU and Green, and well over 20 percentage 
points for SPD and Green voters. 
The question now is, of course, what these findings signify in terms of a 
'successor generation' hypothesis. For the sake of fairness it has to be 
conceded that many who use this term intend it to refer to the elite level, 
describing the young and well educated instead of whole age cohorts. 
However, since this is an analysis of mass attitudes on security, we loosely 
use it as a shorthand for all kinds of generational explanations of changes in 
public opinion on security matters, granting that important differences 
might exist between such changes in social elites and in the public at !arge. 
With these caveats, it is obvious, first, that the sweeping departure from 
previously prevalent attitude patterns regarding national security issues is 
not typical of youth as a whole, but mostly of those younger people who 
sympathize with the Green Party. In the 1987 Bundestag elections the 
Green vote in the 18-30 age bracket was about 17 per cent, so even 
equating the Green electorate with the better educated sections of the 
younger cohorts would be a gross exaggeration. And even the Green 
electorate itself with its strong bias towards youth is quite far from being a 
monolithically anti-military, anti-NATO, anti-US bloc, as Table 5.14 
shows. Younger people outside the Green electorate show little resem-
blance with a 'successor generation' stereotype. 
Second, the fact that the covariation of national security opinions is so 
much stronger with party preference than with age forces us to ponder 
the problem of causality. Between partisan preferences and attitudes on 
specific political issues a variety of causal patterns is conceivable. At the 
one extreme there are those who intend to vote for a particular party 
because it is closest to them on the issues that they judge most salient. At 
the other extreme are those who like a particular party best for a diversity 
of other reasons and for the sake of consistency accept this party's positions 
in areas that are less salient for them. Regarding different political prob-
lems, one and the same individual can easily fall into both groups. In the 
Federal Republic there is, of course, another political issue area that 
heavily, if not primarily, mobilizes Green support, i.e. environmental prob-
lems. The fact that even the comparatively strongly mobilized Green elec-
torate is far from monolithic in its defence policy opinions demonstrates 
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that it is possible for Green voters to disagree with 'their' party in this issue 
area. lt is therefore equally possible that some of those who toe the party 
Iine in these opinions do not do so because these are the attitudes that tie 
them to this party, but simply because they support its proclaimed stand in 
most ongoing political debates, even if they do not centre around the issues 
that have established the initial allegiance. 
Such an interpretation of elite-mass interactions is much broader than a 
'successor generation' hypothesis, indeed comprises it as a special case. lt 
is possible that societal conflict and elite political debates are brought 
about by the polarization of mass attitudes due to generational replace-
ment, but it is equally possible that polarization at the mass level in part 
results from polarization of elite conflict over particular issues. The atti-
tudes of SPD identifiers on security matters illustrate this latter kind of 
development particularly weil. In Table 5.14 they were seen to be not 
dramatically, but visibly, different from those of CDU/CSU voters in 1986. 
This is the outcome of a process that could be clearly observed over the 
1980s, when the SPD leadership redefined many of its positions on national 
security in the wake ofthe NATO decision of 1979, slowly at first, but then 
quite quickly after the overthrow of the Schmidt government in late 1982. 
What we now observe in data as in Table 5.14 is much less the outcome of 
generational replacement within the SPD electorate than of its adaptation 
to the redirection of the party's policies as defined by its leadership.47 In 
the short run, both such processes of elites following the changing demands 
of changing electorates, or of electorates following the policy changes of 
elites, might look very similar at the aggregate level, but they should differ 
considerably in terms of long-run consequences. Generational replacement 
is a slow historical process that can only be slowly counteracted by lifecycle 
effects. Polarization along party lines both at the elite and at the mass level, 
on the other hand, can come about quite quickly, with the issues of the 
day, relevant issue publics, and dividing lines more or less fluent. From the 
data analyzed here it seems safe to infer that for West German mass public 
opinion on national security the 'successor generation' hypothesis can 
hardly be pronounced as the most adequate explanatory approach. 
VIII CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The Bundeswehr as an institution does not face a major problem in terms 
of its acceptance by West German public opinion. There are few people 
that would want to see it liquidated regardless of the availability of 
alternative solutions to the security predicament. On the other band, there 
is also little outright enthusiasm about the Bundeswehr and especially 
about the burden of defence. lt is not regarded as a highly valued symbol of 
sovereignty or of national pride, but rather as a 'necessary load'. This 
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makes it important to study popular attitudes on those attributes of the 
national security environment of the Federal Republic that might let the 
Bundeswehr appear as 'necessary' to the public, as has been done in this 
contribution. 
Here we encounter some attitude patterns that are vexatious, some that 
are reassuring. Some contradictions in public opinion are discomforting 
because they betray a certain predilection for wishful thinking, such as the 
parallel growth of awareness of Eastern military superiority and of the 
belief that the West could successfully defend against aggression. Other 
such contradictions are the coexistence of the endorsement of military 
defence with opposition to any schemes to strengthen Western military 
capabilities, or the considerable insecurity about the role of nuclear weapons 
in the strategy to deter military incursions against Western Europe and the 
Federal Republic. One could contend, however, that the implications of 
such findings should not be exaggerated, because they might not reflect 
unwillingness to maintain capabilities for deterrence and defence, but 
rather low levels of personal importance of, and thus of information about, 
national security affairs. We have not been able to address these issues at 
any length, and there is a conspicuous Jack of appropriate data, but it 
appears safe to say that for sizable portions of the population at !arge we 
simply should not expect very coherent sets of attitudes on such specific 
security issues. 
As to the reassuring findings, it is important, first, to point out that the 
fears, shared by many in the early 1980s, about growing popular neutralism 
and anti-Americanism in the Federal Republic have proved to have little 
basis. Of course, there are those in West Germany (as in many other 
Western nations) who would like to see the country going for neutrality and 
severing defence ties with the USA. In terms both of social structure and 
political background they are concentrated where adherents of protest 
movements have almost always been since the Federal Republic was 
founded. However, these are fringe views that arouse little support from 
the general public. A second point that has to be noticed here is that much 
of what has been said over the past years about generational cleavages in 
West German public opinion on defence was exaggerated, and confused 
the concentration of peace movement activists and protestors in the 
well-educated segment of younger age groups with the views of these 
cohorts in total. This is not to deny that some age effects are discernible in 
defence-related public opinion, but (as has been briefly demonstrated) the 
impact of normal partisan strife on aligning mass attitudes on these matters 
is much stronger. 
As has also been shown, the only really strong change in public opinion 
on national security in the Federal Republic in the 1980s occurred with 
respect to the perceived credibility of US willingness to cooperate peace-
fully and pursue arms control with the East, while the Soviet image in this 
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field has improved considerably. This has not immediately eroded support 
for the Western alliance; such scepticism about the foreign policy of the 
American administration has so far been able to coexist with a strong belief 
in the utility of continuing with established security arrangements. How-
ever, there can be little doubt that this was a potentially very dangerous 
development. Fortunately, policies can change, or at least be modified. 
The INF-agreement signed in Washington, in December 1987, in that 
respect was a very important evolution. In its wake it will most likely prove 
that the deterioration of West German public opinion on the US commit-
ment to arms control does not have tobe irreversible, especially if strategic 
arms control will be pursued as announced and SDI will (in rhetoric and 
practice) be shifted into lower gear. 
lt has been argued here that the cleavages in West German public 
opinion on national security have to a significant degree been determined 
by the political disputes over these issues. If that is so, the recent arms 
control agreement could have a strong impact on these cleavages as well. If 
it is ratified and implemented as planned, and if progress in the field of 
strategic arms control is forthcoming, the West German peace movement, 
that drew its vigor from the decision to deploy new INF and from the 
revival of Cold War rhetoric in superpower relations, will face dire times. 
Of course, some of its proponents will persist with similar arguments as 
before, but much of their rallying power will be gone when these weapons 
are in the process of being extracted. As far as the confrontation between 
the major parties is concerned, there will also be abated incentive to centre 
it around national security issues. The Social Democrats have bad to 
imbibe the lesson of the campaign for the 1983 federal elections that (even 
at that time!) they did not get much electoral mileage out of the missile 
issue. A government that can assert to have removed a major impediment 
to the INF accord by relinquishing West German Pershing Is does not 
present a very opportune target, and neither does a US administration that 
has signed a treaty conforming exactly to the wildest dreams of some SPD 
leaders in the early 1980s and that wants to slice strategic arsenals by 50 per 
cent. Predictions are perilous, but it appears likely that many peace 
movement activists will switch back in their primary concern to environ-
mental issues, and that the SPD will find it more lucrative to challenge the 
government on economic and social issues, of which there are many that 
are close to home for voters. One development that would definitely 
invalidate this prediction, of course, would be a massive drive within 
NATO to increase conventional arms and/or short-range INF or to offset 
the recently signed treaty by some other military means. 
Does all this relate to public opinion in the Federal Republic on the 
Bundeswehr? Very much so, because these attitudes do not exist in 
isolation, but rather are embedded in beliefs about the national security 
environment. Large portions of the public in the Federal Republic seem to 
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be sold on the two pillars of the Harmel Report of twenty years ago (many 
without knowing about this document, of course) in taking deterrence and 
defence, on the one hand, and cooperation and detente, on the other hand, 
as equally serious and essential. If the next few years attest that the 
Western alliance and its leading power seriously do the same, this could 
only reinforce the judgement that this is a coalition of nations worth 
belonging to. Under such conditions the Bundeswehr has a fair chance of 
continuing its present level of general popular acceptance, grumbling 
about the cost of defence notwithstanding. 
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